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Abstract: 
Though many studies have referred to an ‘anti-corruption movement’ beginning in the 
1990’s by major international organizations, none has empirically tested its 
effectiveness on corruption. The data show that from 1997 on, the impact of 
multilateral aid is strongly and robustly associated with lower corruption levels, while 
bilateral aid is shown to be an insignificant determinant.  An increase in any ODA 
pre-1997 is associated with higher levels of corruption or has no impact at all.  Using 
panel data from 1986-2006, this study reveals a more nuanced relationship between 
ODA and corruption than in previous studies and demonstrates that when 
disaggregating the time periods, there are sensitive temporal effects of ODA’s effect 
on corruption overlooked by earlier studies, and provides initial evidence of the 
effectiveness of the international organization (IO), anti-corruption movement in the 
developing world.. 
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"Corruption is a serious threat to good governance and deters investment. Therefore, fighting 
corruption is essential to the development of our economies for the benefit of our people." 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation - Declaration of Santiago.  November 2004 
‘Corruption is “A cancer on the development process and a cancer that is unfortunately the 
cause of a good deal of the poverty that we have seen and particularly in Africa.” – James D. 
Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank 
 
 
       In the wake of the ‘Anti-corruption Movement’ of the mid 1990’s, has foreign aid 
assistance (official development assistance, ODA) had an impact on a recipient country’s 
corruption level?  Moreover, are there reasons to believe that different types of ODA1, 
whether multilateral or bilateral, impact the quality of governance in any systematic way?  
Though the good governance ‘anti-corruption movement has been widely discussed, 
these questions have had surprisingly little empirical attention from literature pertaining 
to the impact on foreign aid on good governance and corruption.  These are of course 
important a question for scholars and policy makers alike, as the volume of ODA 
redistributed from the developed to the developing world has increased substantially over 
the past decade.  This complex relationship has drawn the attention of many scholars in 
recent years and the effects of ODA on ‘good governance’ indicators, whether 
democracy, bureaucratic quality or corruption, remains strongly debated in the literature.  
This study makes a fist step in assessing the vastly complex effects of the ‘anti-corruption 
movement’ by theoretically distinguishing and empirically testing the impact of ODA on 
corruption by disentangling its effects over time and by donor type.   
                                                 
1 ODA is defined as “Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of 
at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of 
donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. 
ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions”.  – OECD glossary of statistics 
terms    
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         One of the first distinctions made by many studies when looking at the effect ODA 
has on democracy, economic growth, etc. is whether the aid is multilateral or bilateral.  
Bilateral ODA is argued by many to be tied with the political agenda of the donor country 
and less focused on ‘good governance’ reform in the recipient country for its own sake.  
Though of course not apolitical, multilateral ODA is seen as relatively more impartial, 
and the program to fight corruption and improve governance in the developing world has 
been at the forefront of the agenda of each major Breton Woods organization since the 
mid-1990’s, and thus might be associated with more effective results in curbing 
corruption.   
         The second distinction is the time period in which one examines the effect of ODA 
on corruption.  What I argue is that previous studies have overlooked this salient 
distinction – that in the post ‘anticorruption movement’ (ACM) era of the major 
international organizations (IO’s) it is theoretically plausible that we should expect 
different results than in previous time periods (Armon 2007).  It is thus the central 
contribution of this paper that a more nuanced relationship between ODA and corruption 
in developing world is uncovered.  Though many scholars have previously found little to 
no impact on democratization or corruption with higher levels of ODA (Knack 2001 and 
2004; Ear 2006) my argument follows from Dunning (2004) in that to better understand 
the more complex relationship2, disaggregating the sample diachronically is of vital 
importance, otherwise a significant relationship might be overlooked        
        I argue that two reasons best explain this relationship.  The first comes from the 
rational side – it is in recipient states’ self-interest to consent to the new demands of their 
                                                 
2 Dunning (2004) demonstrates that there is a different effect of ODA on the level of African countries’ 
democratization scores when separating the Cold War era from the post-Cold War era.  A conditional effect 
that was overlooked in the Goldstein (2001) study which demonstrated a less nuanced relationship.   
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multilateral donors for the sake of their international reputation and in order to maintain 
future ODA.  On the donor side, in seeking to maintain their relevance as major 
international actors of development and governance, the major IO donors have a strong 
incentive to monitor recipient states to uphold ‘their end of the bargain’. The second 
explanation for this more nuanced relationship can be explained by the more normative, 
constructivist approach.  An ‘anticorruption’ norm was instigated by leading IO’s in the 
mid 1990’s and after proliferating to all other major IO’s during this time period, was 
accepted by major actors in the international system.  This in turn brought substantial 
attention on the fight to curb corruption and recipient states followed suit.  I maintain that 
these two approaches help explain the primary hypothesis and empirical finding in this 
analysis in a complementary manner.   
     I test this relationship on 77 ODA recipient countries from 1986 to 2006.  Using the 
two-stage method of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) I model a number of 
potential problems of endogeneity between corruption and ODA using panel data. The 
empirical results show that the “anticorruption” movement adopted by all major IO’s 
proved to be an effective strategy in combating corruption in developing states, while the 
effects of multilateral ODA before this time period have mixed effects.  Bilateral ODA is 
either a negative or insignificant determinant of corruption levels in recipient countries in 
both time periods.  Upon multiple robust checks with alternative specifications and data 
on corruption, the results hold strongly.   
THE IMPACT OF AID ON CORRUPTION 
 
      Corruption, though difficult to characterize in the abstract (Tanzi 1998) and 
admittedly even more difficult to detect in the ‘real world’, is defined as “the abuse of 
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public office for private gain” and has an effect that is “corrosive to the development of a 
state” (Kaufmann 1997: 114).  As Alesina and Dollar point out almost two-thirds of all 
foreign aid collected goes to government consumption (Alesina and Dollar, 2002).  These 
funds are therefore allocated by international sources and end up in the hands of 
government bureaucrats to be distributed in some form to the general public.   Thus, 
some argue that foreign aid allocations are funds that are “ripe territory for corruption” 
(Tavares 2003: 100).  The question is consequently – what effect does foreign aid have 
on corruption and governance in recipient countries?  Not surprisingly, numerous 
previous empirical studies have investigated the relationship between foreign aid, or 
official development assistance (ODA), and some type of democratic-performance 
outcome (Goldsmith 2001; Stone 2004; Olsen 1998; Dunning 2004; Ear 2006; Gokcekus 
and Knörich 2006; Knack 2001, 2005 & 2005; Knack and Rahman 2007).  Some scholars 
have argued that there is a positive relationship between ODA dependence and corruption 
and have reported empirical evidence to support such a claim.   
        The ways in which ODA could potentially exacerbate corruption and harm recipient 
governance has been well documented by Knack (2001, 2004).  The argument essentially 
goes as follows: when aid dependence increases (whether measured by ODA/GDP or 
ODA as a proportion of government consumption) recipient states are expected to 
become less accountable for their own actions, and increases incentives for domestic 
corruption by increasing conflict over aid funds and essentially compensates for 
economic policies and weak government institutions by offering a ‘crutch’ (Knack 2001, 
2004 & 2005).  Some scholars have found empirical support for the notion that, the more 
ODA a state receives relative to its GDP, the worse off their democratic and bureaucratic 
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performance and corruption levels become (Knack 2001, 2004; Knack and Rahman 
2007).  For example, Knack and Rahman (2007) estimate the effects of several 
determinants of bureaucratic quality using the ICRG data and find that quality of 
bureaucratic services are negatively impacted as the proportion of a state’s ODA rises 
relative to GNP (Knack and Rahman 2007: 189, 192).   
        On the other side of the debate, there are numerous scholars who argue that in fact 
ODA does have a positive impact on governance and indeed contributes in reducing 
corruption (Goldsmith 2001; Tavares 2003; Dunning 2004; Ear 2006).  The argument in 
favor of more foreign aid in assisting with democratic development and corruption 
reduction is that IO’s and bilateral donors can bring in certain expertise to developing 
states that they would otherwise not have.  Accountability could in fact be enhanced due 
to international oversight along with numerous conditionality measures which stipulate 
that states must reform their governing practices in order to make them more efficient and 
less corrupt.  Developing states concerned about their reputation will seek to make 
enough reforms so as to receive future ODA. Furthermore, the expertise of some IO 
employees or foreign diplomats could provide the necessary ‘know how’ for developing 
states to make critical reforms in order to improve governance.  Knack (2001) also 
provides the argument that perhaps increases in ODA can make-up for the shortfalls of 
resources in some countries that might be used for the salaries of bureaucrats and thus 
provide less of an incentive for them to practice ‘petty corruption’.   
    Some evidence has been reported by scholars to support the notion that ODA improves 
governance.  In studying African states for example, Goldsmith (2001) finds that 
increases of ODA as the proportion of GDP are associated with higher levels of 
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democratic performance and economic freedom. Dunning (2004) replicates these results, 
but when disaggregating the time period into the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 
he finds that ODA only improves democratization in the later.  Moreover, Taveres (2003) 
finds that even when controlling for such factors as economic development, oil resources 
and political rights, ODA has a strong and statistically significant relationship with 
curbing corruption.   However, there appears to be no clear theoretical or empirical 
consensus on the effects of ODA on outcome variables such as quality of governance in 
general or corruption specifically.  This analysis builds on these previous contributions 
while adding a more nuanced explanation of this complex relationship.   
THE ‘ACM’ AND ITS IMPACT ON RECIPIENT STATES 
       ODA has become an increasingly more relevant source of income in developing 
regions over time as shown in Figure 1.  Of particular interest to this study is the 
subsequent impact of the consensus among major international organizations to shift 
significant attention to the agenda of “good governance” in the mid to late 1990’s3.  
Beginning with the OECD in 1994, discussions on bribery came to the forefront by 1996, 
when a binding convention on “Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions” was signed by all 36 OECD member states 
(Sandholz and Gray 2003).  The World Bank (WB) followed suit with a clear message 
about fighting corruption and began working the non-governmental organization (NGO) 
Transparency International in 1997 on combating such practices, along with establishing 
its own anticorruption institution the World Bank Institute (WBI), which together take on 
a number of corruption related problems.  Since this time, the WB has tied anti-
                                                 
3 This chronology is well document in previous published analyses (Sandholz and Gray 2003; Bukovansky 
2001; Goldstein 2001; Hjertholm and White 1998) so for the sake of parsimony, I do not go into great 
historical detail.   
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corruption practices to its list of conditionalities (Pieth 1997; Sandholz and Gray 2003).  
The IMF, though not a development institution, in addition to the other Bretton Woods 
financial institutions began its campaign against corruption in 1996.  In 1997, the 
organization finalized the first round of discussions on policies against corruption and 
declared its new agenda to combat it (International Monetary Fund 1997).  Moreover the 
United Nations created its own division called the Management Development and 
Government Division (MGDG) in 1995, which by 1997 was elected by the member states 
to pursue an agenda of government accountability and transparency.  Lastly, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) compelled each member state to join the Working Group on 
Transparency in Government Procurement in 1996, which dealt with accountability and 
corruption issues.  In addition to the major global IO’s, a number of regional IO’s have 
followed suit in the anti-corruption theme as well, such as the European Union and the 
Organization of American States signing comprehensive anti-corruption initiatives.   
***Figure 1 about here***  
        This analysis explores whether the new anti-corruption measures have had any 
significant impact on corruption levels in recipient countries.  The ACM could have had 
an impact for two reasons, stemming from either the rationalist/ utility-based or 
constructivist/ normative perspective. First, on the normative side, the ‘anti corruption 
norm’ ensured that multilateral donors were serious about ODA being used for measures 
that fought corruption and improved governance in recipient states.  As Bennet and 
Finnemore explain (1999), “having established rules and norms, IO’s are eager to spread 
the benefits of their expertise and often act as conveyor belts for the transmission of 
norms and models of ‘good’ behavior”…and that “developing states continue to be a 
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popular target for norm diffusion by IO’s” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 416-17).  The 
inspiration for the ‘anti-corruption’ norm is ideational or normative in the sense that IO’s 
sought to combat a coercive element found in many developing states in order to improve 
governance and economic performance world-wide.  Much like norms related to 
women’s suffrage, non-proliferation and human rights, they are driven by a select group 
of ‘idealist’ states, then accepted by international actors (in this case IO’s) and then 
‘cascaded’ throughout the system (Dubois 1994; Katzenstein 1996a; Finnemore and Sikk.  
Whether the norms of ‘good governance’ in this case are accepted domestically, of course 
is a matter of self interest on the part of the developing country itself.   
        Second, as Finnemore and Sikkith note, “In addition, international norms must 
always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms, 
which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation of these norms” 
(Finnemore and Sikkith 1998: 893) This “two-level game” (Putnam 1988) between 
international ideas and domestic change leads into the rational side, where both the 
donors and recipients have incentives to push for good governance reforms when 
channels of multilateral ODA are established.  In the case of recipient states acting 
rationally in their own interest, I posit that states are concerned with two simultaneous 
issues – reputation and future aid.   States receiving multilateral ODA that are strongly 
tied to anti-corruption and good governance stipulations must in return make at least 
minimal reforms or else face the consequences of obtaining a poor reputation and face 
foreign aid cuts from skeptical donors in the future.  It is therefore in their interest to 
comply so as to obtain such aid in the future.  The reputation concerns also impact the 
multilateral donors – that the conditional policies that they tie with ODA actually have an 
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impact after the aid is received by the recipient country.  The less reforms are observed 
from recipient countries, the less relevant such donor IO’s become and future stipulations 
of reform are likely to be taken less seriously by developing states.  Consequently, the 
donors have incentives to monitor recipients so as to ensure some necessary changes are 
made with respect to improving governance.  
THE POST-ACM, MULTILATERAL AID HYPOTHESIS 
         The central contribution of this study is the expectation that both time and source of 
ODA matter in the relationship between foreign aid and corruption.  Briefly, the 
drawbacks to bilateral aid are clear -  the donor country can set whatever agenda it wishes 
with the ODA, and oftentimes, such aid is “tied aid”, which many scholars have show can 
exacerbate wasteful government consumption (CIDA 2001) and distort trade (Pratt 
1994).  Recipient states are perceived to be much more willing to accept council from 
IO’s than from other governments directly, which underscores multilateral aid’s relative 
effectiveness to bilateral OD (Ehrenfeld 2005).  However, because of previous mixed 
empirical results on the relationship between ODA and corruption, I argue that it is that 
neither multilateral nor bilateral aid will play any significant role in levels of corruption 
for recipient states before the major shift in focus to the ‘Anti Corruption Movement’ 
(Bukovsky 2002) in the mid 1990’s as outlined in a previous section.  Due to bilateral 
ODA being largely strategic and that a lack of serious attention before the mid-1990’s to 
combating corruption by multilateral actors, there is no reason to believe that either type 
of ODA would be an effective determinant in reducing corruption in developing states.  
Subsequently, the shift by major multilateral donors to ‘good governance’ and fighting 
corruption created movement for a new international norm to improve governance 
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conditions in recipient countries4.  What I seek to test empirically in this study is whether 
or not this shift in focus has had any substantive effect – whether the source (i.e. the 
major multilateral IO’s) that has advanced the ‘anticorruption norm’ have impacted 
corruption levels in any significant way, which will be operationalized by the multilateral 
aid.   
        Based on the literature on bilateral aid and the findings of Alesina and Weder (2002) 
I leave open the possibility that bilateral sources may or may not be associated with 
higher levels of corruption perceptions in developing states.  However, the contrast 
between the two sources is intended only to show possible differences in the effects of 
multilateral and bilateral ODA after the ACM begins (if any exist), not to have any 
specific theories about bilateral aid in and of itself.  Finally, the effect of multilateral 
foreign aid prior to 1997 is not expected to play any significant role in determining 
variation in corruption levels because the ‘good governance’ norms had yet to be 
universally accepted by all major donors before this time.   
DATA, SPECIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT 
 
       The dependent variable in this study is corruption as operationalized by a leading 
indicator of this concept, which is taken from the Political Risk Services Group’s (PRS) 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  The PRS Group, a think tank specialized in 
economic and political risk assessment internationally, has published monthly data for 
business and investors on over 140 countries since 1980.  The PRS measure is primarily 
concerned with accounting for “excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-
                                                 
4 While this dichotomy might seem somewhat crude, it allows me to maximize the number of developing 
states in the sample, as opposed to using measures such as DFID aid for example.  The trade-off with using 
multilateral aid in the aggregate is of course that the level of abstraction becomes higher, yet using more 
specific data on aid specifically targeting corruption is too limited and significantly reduces the number of 
cases. 
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for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business.”5  A primary advantage for this study is the time period of this indicator ranges 
from 1984-2006 and has up to 139 countries, while other indicators such as the World 
Bank or Transparency International either have far too little or no data before 1997 
needed to test the hypothesis in this study.  The data in the analysis has a finite range 
from ‘0’-‘10’, with higher scores indicating lower levels of perceived corruption.  The 
PRS data has been used in numerous recent publications on determinants of corruption 
(Ades and Di Tella 1999; Dollar et al 2001; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Knack 
and Rahman 2007; Charron and Lapuente 2009).  Figure 2 breaks the data down by 
region across the time period in the study6.  Clearly there is a substantial amount of 
variance and movement among the regions, with some showing stability at the aggregate 
during the time period and others, such as the post-Soviet, Eastern European bloc, 
demonstrating substantial declines.  Of the 138 countries in the ICRG data for 2005 for 
example, Finland ranks best with a score of 10, followed by Sweden, New Zeeland and 
Denmark with 9.16.  Developing countries have a significant range of variance; with 
countries like Nigeria (1.67), Pakistan (2.5), and Gabon (1.60) rank on the low end while 
Chile (6.67), Botswana (5.0), Jordan (5.0) and Singapore (7.5), rank among the least 
corrupt outside of the OECD. 
***Figure 2 about here*** 
       The empirical tests are to be conducted as parsimoniously as possible.  The primary 
independent variables, bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA, are annual data taken from 
the World Bank.  Clearly there are finer distinctions one can make with ODA, yet this 
                                                 
5 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx  
6 Countries are assigned to a region according to Hadenius and Teorell (2005).  For a clear description of 
the data, see the Quality of Government data codebook at: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/  
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simple disaggregation is made to maximize observations and maintain a level of 
parsimony to the analysis.  Following the format of Goldsmith (2001), I take each figure 
as an annual proportion to a state’s GNP, which is thus essentially measuring the level of 
dependence on ODA for each recipient country.  Other significant determinants of 
corruption are also controlled for in the full model.  Level of institutionalized democracy 
(democracy) is a measure from Freedom House and measures the level of political rights 
on a scale of 1-7.  I invert the scale to indicate that higher numbers equal higher levels of 
democracy.  Higher levels of democracy are anticipated to be associated with lower 
levels of corruption, as found by previous empirical studies (Sandholtz and Gray 2003; 
Treisman 2000).  Secondly, I control for economic development with the log of GDP per 
capita annually from the World Bank (logGDP).  Higher levels of economic development 
are consistently shown in the literature as having a negative impact on corruption levels 
(La Porta et al 1999; Treisman 2000). Additionally, I control for a state’s level of ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity by including Alesina et al’s (2003) level of ethno linguistic 
fractionalization (Ethnic Frac.)  Several studies have demonstrated a positive relationship 
between ethnic and linguistic diversity in a country and corruption levels (See Charron 
2009).  Finally, I control for a country’s legal system, in particular common law (UK 
Common) has been shown compared to others to be a significant factor in a developing 
country’s transitional phase to well functioning government institutions (La Porta et al 
1999). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
         Due to data restraints in the dependent variable, I run models based on a limited 
time frame, between 1986 and 2006. Based on the potential problems of endogeneity and 
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the mixed empirical evidence suggesting that corruption could in fact impact the levels of 
ODA a country receives - with some claiming that it has a negative relationship with aid 
(McGillivary  et al. 2002) and others finding null or mixed results (Alesina and Weder 
2002; Alesina and Dollar 2000) - OLS may no be longer be the best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE).  In the presence of edogeneity from reverse-causality one of the key 
OLS assumptions is therefore violated7.  I elect to model this problem explicitly.  First, I 
run a series of regressions using GMM estimation on panel data, introduced by Hansen 
(1982), which  employs a two-stage process taking into account problems associated with 
endogeneity and produces more efficient and reliable estimates than 2SLS in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity (Baum, Shaffer and Stillman 2003).  The two-staged analysis 
assumes that (1) the model is specified correctly and that valid instruments are employed, 
(2) the error terms of the variables are normally distributed, (3) outliers should be 
controlled for or removed and (4) observations in the data are independent of one 
another.  With regard to the first assumption, based on the recent corruption literature and 
edogeneity found in the data between ODA and corruption, the GMM analysis with the 
parsimonious amount of control variables seems appropriate.  Assessing the validity of 
the instruments is done by first testing the instrument relevance with a first stage F-test 
(see Wright 2003: 322) and second by using a post-estimation Sargan-Hansen test.  With 
respect to the additional assumptions, based on scatter plots of the error terms along with 
variance of the variables in the model there is nothing exceptional about the way these 
are distributed to cause alarm when outliers are removed from the sample.  Moreover, 
none of the independent variables correlate higher than 0.32 (democracy and logGDP per 
                                                 
7 The post-estimation Wu-Hausman test in the 2SLS and GMM statistic in the 2-stage models I run indicate 
that there is indeed consistent endogeneity in the models, and thus the specification appears to be correct.   
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capita), while the rest are less than 0.15.  On the issue of outliers, I make two adjustments 
to the sample.  First, there are three extreme outliers with respect to ODA that if included, 
violate one of  the assumptions of model and significantly alter the results – Sudan, Niger 
and Ghana – which receive levels of multilateral aid in multiple years from 1995-2006 
that are well above three standard deviations over the mean sample level8. Numerous 
scholars in the literature on GMM models and 2SLS models have pointed to the 
potentially hazardous and misleading effects of extreme outlying cases when estimating 
models with panel data (see Huber 1981; Lucas, van Djuk and Kloek 2007; Baum et al. 
2003).  In particular, in datasets where a few cases demonstrate significantly divergent 
behavior from the majority of cases in the sample and the number of cross-sectional units 
is substantially greater than the number of time periods, as in the case of this study, the 
outliers can substantially impact the estimates in misleading ways (Lucas, van Djuk and 
Kloek 2007).  If the cases are few, then dropping them or controlling for them in the 
model is an appropriate solution, both are done in empirical section.  Secondly, based on 
Figure 2, the East Asian countries show a trend that is divergent from the rest of the 
sample in that there is a sizable and rapid drop-off in corruption scores from 1999 on, 
while at the same time this group received less ODA due to rapid economic growth.  I 
control for this by reporting models with and without this region.   
         The ODA is the instrumented variable in the first stage of the equation (and lagged 
by one year), which includes all independent variables (time variant controls are lagged 
                                                 
8 For example, in 2003, 6.75 percent of Ghana’s GDP was in multilateral development aid (sample mean 
for that year was 0.20), in 2004, Sudan (along with experiencing extreme civil conflict) received 7.25 of 
GDP in multilateral aid.  Similarly, Niger reached levels of 3.5 of multilateral aid as a percentage GDP 
during the years from 1996-1998, and remained ad over 1.5 percent since.   I check the results with their 
inclusion as well, using dummy variables, and though the estimates are in the same direction, the 
significance of the coefficients is weakened in certain models.  Please write the author for the estimates 
with the inclusion of the outliers.   
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by two years) as well as colonial history, regional dummies and corruption lagged by the 
average past corruption score from the previous 2-5 years9, so as to include as many 
observations as possible and avoid misleading anomalies.  The second stage includes a 
lagged value of the dependent variable, the instrumented ODA, along with the four 
control variables (time variant controls are lagged by one year).  Both the effect of ODA 
on corruption and corruption on ODA are therefore explicitly modeled.  The dependent 
variable and ODA in each stage is thus a function of its own past values as well as the 
past values of ODA.  This can help demonstrate causality in the sense of Granger (1969) 
– if ‘X’ at time ‘t’ significantly impacts ‘Y’ at ‘t’+1 (with ‘Y’ at time ‘t’ also known), 
which is of vital importance for understanding the impact of the ACM on later corruption 
levels in recipient states. 
        Two separate time period are analyzed, before and after 199710.  The models are 
regressed on all available data before and after 1997 to test the impact of ODA (both 
multilateral and bilateral) on corruption11.  I check the robustness of the results by 
employing a standard two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS) with both ICRG data and 
alternative sources of corruption data from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al 2008) and 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  Further, I check the 
sensitivity of the time frame by setting the start year of the ACM at 1998 and 2000 to see 
                                                 
9 The lagged corruption score is thus: ((corruption (t-2) + (t-3) + (t-4) + (t-5)/ 4)).  Because of the 4-year 
average, in cases of missing data, the state-year is simply omitted from the calculation and the denominator 
of the equation is adjusted accordingly.   
10 In additional robust checks, I change the ACM year to 1998 and 2000, and remove some of the 
instruments, such as the colonial heritage, with no significant changes in the results.   
11 I elect to regress bilateral and multilateral ODA on corruption in separate models due to relatively high 
levels of mulitcollinearity, which results in more efficient coefficient estimates.   
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if the results are time sensitive.  Finally, the sample of states in the empirical analyses is 
all developing (recipient) states for which corruption data is available12.   
RESULTS 
       The models in both Table 1 and Table 2 report the two-stage estimates to capture the 
effect of the relationship between ODA and corruption levels.  Both the GMM and 2SLS 
methods of estimation are extensions of linear regression and interpretation is similar to 
that of OLS13.   
***Table 1 about Here* 
        The estimates in Table 1 are intended to elucidate the effects of the two types of 
ODA before and after the ACM14.  Additionally, all models account for past values of the 
dependent variable to control for autocorrelation and to avoid any potential problems 
with the instrumented corruptiont-2 being correlated with the error term.  Model 1 
examines the overall effect of total ODA over the entire time period, demonstrating 
essentially ‘what we would miss’ if the data was not disaggregated by time and aid 
source.  As several studies have reported, total levels of ODA is actually associated with 
greater levels of corruption (see Knack and Rahman 2007) yet the coefficient fails to 
reach an appropriate level of significance in model 1. Models 2 and 4 show the impact of 
multilateral and bilateral aid on corruption for all available cases before 1997.  While 
standard control variables in the model, such as level of political rights (democracy) and 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization are significant determinants of corruption levels, neither 
                                                 
12 Iraq is omitted as an outlier case due to the huge influx of ODA starting in 2003.  Additionally, 
Afghanistan has no data on corruption. 
13 For an in depth analysis of GMM and other 2-stage models, see Baum, Shaffer and Stillman (2003) 
14 Running the multilateral and bilateral ODA data in the same model introduces a high level of 
multicollinearity as indicated by post estimation t-tests.  For the sake of efficiency and clarity, I elect to run 
them separately in this analysis.   
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bilateral nor multilateral aid impacts corruption in recipient states significantly during 
this time period, yet both exhibit negative coefficients.  However, when moving to 
models 3 and 5, which elucidate the post-ACM effects of ODA, the estimates show a 
different impact on the dependent variable for multilateral aid entirely.  A one unit 
increase in multilateral aid is quite substantial, estimated with a reduction of corruption 
by almost an entire standard deviation of the ICRG variable (1.66), and unlike bilateral 
aid, statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.  However, a one unit increase 
(one additional percent of GDP coming from ODA) would be a sizable increase and is 
not all that likely according to the data.  A more realistic interpretation would be to use 
one tenth of a one unit increase, which would result in an approximately 0.17 increase in 
the ICRG corruption score.  Again, three diagnostic tests are included for each model.  
First, as recommended by Wright (2003) the first stage F-test provides a “sufficient (but 
not necessary) test for underidentification” (Wright 2003:  329).  All models have a 
significant F-statistic, meaning that we would not suspect a ‘weak instrument’ problem in 
the models .  Second,  Baum, Shaffer and Stillman (2003) recommend a test for 
endogeneity of the regressor (a ‘C-statistic test’, where the null hypothesis is that the two 
stages are exogenous), which demonstrates the presence of endogeneity in all models 
except for model 1.  Finally, I check the validity of the instruments in stage one with a 
Sargan-Hansen J-test.  In all models except for 7 and 9 in Table 1 (bilateral aid with the 
World Bank and CPI data), the p-values are insignificant, meaning the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected in most cases.   
       Models 6-9 test the hypothesis with alternative indicators of corruption.  Both are 
composite indices made up of multiple surveys conducted by numerous sources and are 
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available annually for a substantial number of countries from 1996 on15.  Since the time 
range for these variables is limited, only the effects of the post-ACM time period are 
analyzed.  Here we see robust support for the results in models 3 and 5 and the results for 
multilateral aid.  An increase in multilateral aid during this time period is strongly  
associated with lower levels of corruption in both the World Bank data and Transparency 
International’s CPI, demonstrating wider support for the hypothesis.  Notably, the 
estimates for bilateral aid with alternative indicators of corruption have a slightly 
significant and negative impact on corruption levels. 
***Table 2 about Here*** 
        Moving to Table 2, I test the robustness of the results from Table 1.  The estimates 
in Table 2 largely corroborate the findings in Table 1.  The first four columns in Table 2 
replicate models 2-5 in Table 1 using a simple two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator 
with the same instrumented variable for each ODA indicator as in Table 1.  Again, the 
effects of both types of foreign aid have a impact on the corruption that is 
indistinguishable from zero before 1997.  However, the signs for the multilateral ODA 
coefficient is positive after 1997 and significant at the 95% level of confidence, 
indicating the sensitive temporal effects of aid, possibly driven by the ACM.  Similar to 
Table 1, bilateral aid has no discernable impact on corruption levels when using the 
ICRG data.   
         Models 5-10 test the sensitivity of the sample of recipient countries and the time 
period of the ACM.  In models 5 and 6, I exclude East Asian states from the analysis.  
Based on the aggregate figures from Figure 2, we observe that this group declines 
                                                 
15 The World Bank data was available bi-annually from 1996-2002, and has been available annually from 2002 to the 
current year.  More detail on the World Bank and Transparency International data can be  found in the Quality of 
Government’s data codebook: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/  
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significantly in corruption scores after around 1999.  This trend occurred while states in 
East Asia were receiving significantly less ODA during this time period due to their 
economic development16.  These two simultaneous trends pose a potentially problem in 
that they could be driving the results in the post-ACM period analysis.  Models 5 and 6 
address this issue.  The results show in models 5 and 6 that although removing the East 
Asian states from the sample reduces the size of the coefficients of a number of estimates 
– namely both forms of aid, democracy and GDP – the effect of multilateral ODA in the 
post-ACM era remains strongly significant and in the expected direction.    
         The results thus far have corroborated the hypothesis that multilateral aid in the 
post-ACM time period is associated with less corruption.  In models 7-10, I use 
alternative start-years of the ACM, testing for the possibility that the results may be 
sensitive to the start-year of the ACM used in Table 1 (1997). Since all of the models 
have either shown a non-significant or slightly negative relationship between bilateral aid 
and the dependent variable, I analyze only multilateral aid in models 7-10 in the post-
ACM time period with ICRG and World Bank data17.  In models 7 and 8 I test the 
sensitivity of the start year in the previous models and employ 1998 as the start-year of 
the ACM.  Moreover, I exclude the East Asian states from the models to create a more 
stringent test for the hypothesis18.  Although weakened slightly, the coefficients remain 
largely the same, in particular for the multilateral ODA, which is in the expected 
direction and statistically significant.    In models 9 and 10, the ACM is set as the year 
2000.  For both the World Bank and ICRG indicators of corruption the effects of 
                                                 
16 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
17 The World Bank data is chosen over the CPI because it contains more observations. 
18 However, I run models 7-10 with the inclusion of the East Asian countries as well, with the results robust 
to those reported in Table 2.  For the sake of space, I do not report them.  Please contact the author for the 
full tables. 
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multilateral aid remain positive and 99% and 95% significant respectively.  In sum, 
irrespective of the corruption data employed, the start date of the ACM used, or sample, 
the effects of the ACM (as measured by multilateral aid) are consistently associated with 
lower levels of corruption.  The data however is slightly sensitive to changes in the start 
year of the ACM regime. Thus while the results mainly reveal strong support of the 
hypothesis, one must interpret them with caution; in particular due to the imperfect 
operationalization of the ACM regime.    
         Briefly, the control variables throughout the model showed to be more or less 
consistent irrespective of specification and time period.  In particular the Freedom House, 
political rights variable and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization variables were mainly 
robust to alternative specification.  For example, a one unit increase on the political rights 
scale is expected to result in anywhere from a 0.05 to a 0.23 increase in corruption score 
for the ICRG data, depending on specification.  Somewhat surprisingly, the GDP per 
capita, which was consistently positive throughout the models, was only statistically 
significant when employing the World Bank and Transparency International data as the 
dependent variable or when the ACM start year was set later (2000) with the ICRG data.   
CONCLUSION 
                This study provides a more nuanced explanation and empirical examination 
between the complicated effects of foreign aid on domestic corruption levels.  While the 
data on corruption and using multilateral ODA as a proxy for the anti-corruption 
movement are not perfect indicators of the respective concepts they are used to represent, 
it would seem that given this caveat, there is relatively strong empirical support for the 
‘anti-corruption’ hypothesis - that based on the strong correlation between multilateral 
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ODA and the dependent variable, the anticorruption movement has in fact been relatively 
effective in curbing the level of corruption in recipient countries during the regime.  This 
can be distinguished from bilateral aid, which was shown to be largely an insignificant 
(or slightly negative) determinant of corruption levels in recipient states.  The results 
demonstrated that multilateral aid in the pre-ACM time period proved ineffective in 
combating corruption, yet it revealed to be quite successful in the sample which examines 
only the time period after 1997 (the year by which all major IO’s had signed agreements 
on fighting corruption).  The effects of multilateral ODA dependence are strong and 
generally robust across all three indicators of corruption, using multiple specifications, 
different start-years, including and excluding East Asian states and when controlling for 
economic development, level of democracy, colonial heritage and ethnic 
fractionalization.  However, since it was not possible to measure the ACM directly, there 
is always the possibility that the results are somewhat spurious, and thus should be 
interpreted with a degree of caution.  Further, while the alternative indicators, namely the 
World Bank ‘control of corruption’ and the CPI, corroborated the findings from the 
ICRG data, they are not available for the pre-ACM time period.  Thus I could not conduct 
a ‘pre-test’ so to speak, and we are therefore not privy to whether or not the ACM altered 
any relation between the two types of ODA and corruption as measured by the World 
Bank and Transparency International.   
      In addition, there are methodological difficulties in studies such as these, namely the 
issue of endogeneity.  Scholars have reported that the relationship works both ways (i.e. 
that ODA impacts corruption and corruption impacts ODA) and thus the researcher must 
pay a good deal of attention to the modeling of this issue so as to not to produce biased 
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estimates.  While there is no perfect solution to this problem, this study used multiple 
two-stage regression with lagged independent variables, modeling corruption as a 
function of past values of itself and ODA (as well the control variables) while 
simultaneously modeling ODA as a function of past values of corruption (and two-year 
lagged GDP and democracy values along with regional and colonial heritage controls).   
        Some practical implications follow from these results.  One, the relatively 
newfound, worldwide attention to overall “good governance” and more specifically to 
fighting corruption has been rather effective from a multilateral standpoint.  The data 
show that after the ‘anti corruption’ norm was accepted in the mid 1990’s, multilateral 
agencies, which can be considered to have less of their own political agenda with respect 
to the aid that they allocate compared with direct bilateral aid, were considerably more 
effective in producing better governance relative to bilateral ODA investments.  Bilateral 
ODA donors remain to be perceived as tying their own self-interest to the aid that they 
allocate to recipient countries.  The results between the two time frames are thus 
interesting in the sense that neither ODA strategy, multilateral or bilateral, was associated 
with significantly lower levels of corruption in the early to mid 1990’s.  Yet when 
attention was focused on the anticorruption movement, the agencies were apparently able 
to, with processes of loan allocation that are mostly more transparent than those of 
bilateral transactions, have achieved a significant task – bringing down levels of 
corruption levels in the developing world.   However, this study demonstrates only a 
strong correlation into this relationship.  In further scholarship, more theoretical 
development as to more thoroughly elucidate the underlying causal mechanism is needed. 
 24
         Secondly, and further, it is clear that if states are serious about fighting corruption – 
and there are both economic and moral reasons for the international community to be 
such (Bukovansky 2002) – a policy should be shifted in order to allocate more resources 
to IO’s for ODA redistribution.  Accomplishing this is of course easier said than done – 
states collect revenues from their citizens who expect their leaders to spend their money 
in their interest.  However, though more investigation and study into the nuanced 
relationship between these two variables shown in this analysis, the data and results in 
this study demonstrate that one channel of foreign aid is more effective than another in 
accomplishing positive results for improving governance and combating corruption.   
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Table 1: Disaggregating the Effects of ODA on Corruption     
           
  All ODA Bilateral ODA Multilateral ODA World Bank CPI 
Variable  Full Model Pre ACM Post ACM Pre ACM Post ACM Bilat Multi Bilat Multi 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Lagged corruption 0.498*** 0.643*** 0.405*** 0.635*** 0.388*** 0.088*** 0.069*** 0.245*** 0.237*** 
  (0.028) (0.042) (0.037) (0.042) (0.036) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.031) 
ODA   0.054         
  (0.150)         
Bilateral    -0.067 0.016   -0.118*  -0.311*  
   (0.234) (0.221)   (0.062)  (0.174)  
Multilateral     -0.122 1.65**  0.62**  0.893*** 
     (0.191) (0.633)  (0.214)  (0.293) 
Democracy  0.107*** 0.057** 0.162*** 0.064** 0.203*** 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.209*** 0.098*** 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.013) (0.012) (0.038) (0.028) 
LogGDP   0.088* 0.082 0.056 0.081 0.067 0.366*** 0.35*** 0.891*** 0.757*** 
  (0.051) (0.077) (0.053) (0.079) (0.057) (0.029) (0.029) (0.088) (0.077) 
Ethnic Frac. -0.346** -0.094 -0.514** -0.134 -0.503** -0.035 -0.051 -0.105 -0.147 
  (0.169) (0.272) (0.196) (0.262) (0.205) (0.072) (0.071) (0.172) (0.165) 
UK Common 0.009 0.272** 0.062 0.243** 0.054 0.127*** 0.039 0.492*** 0.309** 
  (0.018) (0.106) (0.105) (0.095) (0.107) (0.043) (0.044) (0.106) (0.105) 
Const.  2.19*** 1.45** 3.65*** 1.41** 3.39*** -3.62*** -3.34*** -5.13*** -3.91*** 
    (0.51) (0.615) (0.57) (0.62) (0.59) (0.27) (0.26) (0.33) (0.71) 
1st Stage F-Test  8.53 3.97 7.03 3.81 10.65 5.75 11.62 7.93 11.81 
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Obs.   962 351 573 351 573 359 359 359 359 
Number of countries 78 75 75 75 75 75 75 68 68 
GMM C stat 3.28 1.25 2.55 2.38 3.89 7.62 23.76 7.23 21.24 
Sargan-Hansen  0.41 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.44 0.09 0.34 0.04 0.23 
                      
Note: This table uses Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) two-staged estimation.  The first-stage F-test 
in the linear IV model tests for instrument relevance.  The null hypothesis that all of the instruments are uncorrelated 
with all of the endogenous regressors.  The GMM C statistic provides at test Durbin-Wu-Hausmen test of 
whether the regressors treated as endogenous during estimation could in fact be treated as exogenous.  The 
Sargan-Hansen J-test performs an overidentification test the validity of the independent variables, 
significant p-values reject the null hypothesis (no overidentification).  The instruments used in the first 
stage for each type of ODA are all lagged independent variables, colonial origin, regional dummies and a 
two to five-year (averaged) lagged dependent variable.  The year of ACM in the models is 1997.  
Alternative variables from World Bank and Transparency International (CPI) are used only for the time-
period after 1997 as they have almost no coverage before hand.  They range from -2.5 to 2.5 and 0 to 10 
respectively, with higher numbers indicating lower corruption. Thus, the 5-year lagged dependent variable 
(ICRG) used in the first as a regressor of the ODA instrumented variable in the first four models is kept so 
as to address (albeit imperfectly) the endogeneity problem in models 5-8.  Robust standard errors correcting 
for heteroskedasticity in parentheses.                                                                                                                                    
 p*<.10, p**<.05, p***<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Robustness Checks         
   2SLS  GMM (no E. Asia) Multilateral ODA only (no E. Asia) 
Variable  
Pre 
ACM 
Post 
ACM 
Pre 
ACM 
Post 
ACM PostACM PostACM amc1998WB amc1998 amc2000WB amc2000 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7   10 10 
Lagged corruption 0.637*** 0.411*** 0.611*** 0.401*** 0.429*** 0.430*** 0.073*** 0.441*** 0.075*** 0.446*** 
  (0.045) (0.038) (0.046) (0.039) (0.036) (0.040) (0.013) (0.037) (0.015) (0.039) 
Bilateral  0.138 -0.049   -0.010      
  (0.307) (0.290)   (0.223)      
Multilateral    -0.100 1.62**  1.51** 0.818** 1.31** 0.865*** 1.23** 
    (0.303) (0.712)  (0.64) (0.253) (0.618) (0.274) (0.62) 
Democracy  0.081** 0.141*** 0.091** 0.195*** 0.127*** 0.161*** 0.069*** 0.186*** 0.076*** 0.237*** 
  (0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.013) (0.033) (0.015) (0.036) 
LogGDP  0.154 0.021 0.122 0.041 0.021 0.010 0.351*** 0.045 0.35*** 0.135** 
  (0.095) (0.068) (0.095) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) (0.031) (0.063) (0.035) (0.067) 
Ethnic Frac. -0.045 -0.569** -0.120 -0.51** -0.560** -0.596** -0.087 -0.569** -0.053 -0.701*** 
  (0.302) (0.205) (0.293) (0.212) (0.193) (0.211) (0.073) (0.205) (0.081) (0.207) 
UK Common 0.152 0.056 0.132 0.048 0.114 0.079 0.041 0.136 002 0.128 
  (0.142) (0.107) (0.177) (0.115) (0.101) (0.107) (0.045) (0.111) (0.051) (0.123) 
Const.  1.01 3.36*** 1.35 1.05 3.50*** 3.31*** -3.40*** 3.62*** -3.41*** 4.37*** 
    (0.77) (0.61) (0.75) (0.77) (0.59) (0.57) (0.27) (0.58) (0.32) (0.67) 
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 1st Stage F-Test 3.72 5.53 3.26 9.30 5.59 11.29 6.62 10.81 6.65 11.27 
Obs.   351 573 351 573 562 562 353 494 282 352 
No. of countries 75 75 75 75 71 71 71 71 71 71 
GMM C stat     3.89 4.98 8.13 4.03 9.72 3.24 
Sargan-Hansen  0.16 0.18 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.51 0.16 0.17 
                        
Note: This table uses 2SLS and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) two-staged estimation.  The first-
stage F-test in the linear IV model tests for instrument relevance.  The null hypothesis that all of the instruments are 
uncorrelated with all of the endogenous regressors.  The GMM C statistic provides at test Durbin-Wu-Hausmen 
test of whether the regressors treated as endogenous during estimation could in fact be treated as 
exogenous.  The Sargan-Hansen J-test performs an overidentification test the validity of the independent 
variables, significant p-values reject the null hypothesis (no overidentification).  The instruments used in 
the first stage for each type of ODA are all lagged independent variables, colonial origin, regional dummies 
and a two to five-year (averaged) lagged dependent variable.  The year of ACM in the models is 1997.  
Alternative variables from World Bank and Transparency International (CPI) are used only for the time-
period after 1997 as they have almost no coverage before hand.  They range from -2.5 to 2.5 and 0 to 10 
respectively, with higher numbers indicating lower corruption. Thus, the 5-year lagged dependent variable 
(ICRG) used in the first as a regressor of the ODA instrumented variable in the first four models is kept so 
as to address (albeit imperfectly) the endogeneity problem in models 5-8.  Robust standard errors correcting 
for heteroskedasticity in parentheses.                                                                                                                                    
 p*<.10, p**<.05, p***<.01 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 30
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
In
  B
ill
io
ns
 o
f U
.S
. D
ol
la
rs
 (2
00
5 
co
ns
ta
nt
)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Trends in Official Development Aid (ODA): 1960-2006
Total Multilateral ODA Total Bilateral ODA
Total ODA
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 31
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
19
95
19
90
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
E. Europe & Post USSR L. America N. Africa & Mid. East Sub-Saharan Africa
W. Europe & N. America E. Asia S. E. Asia S. Asia
Pacific Islands Caribbean
Annual ICRG Corrption Scores by Region: 1986-2006
Notes: annual ICRG scores are regional averages, ranging from 0-10 with higher scores indicating less corruption.  
Regions taken from Hadenius and Teorell (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A. List of States   
 32
Algeria Guyana Nigeria  
Angola Haiti Pakistan  
Azerbaijan Honduras Panama  
Argentina India Papua New Guinea 
Bahrain Indonesia Paraguay  
Bangladesh Iran Peru  
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Philippines  
Bolivia Jamaica Guinea-Bissau 
Botswana Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia 
Brazil Jordan Senegal  
Cameroon Kenya Sierra Leone 
Sri Lanka Korea, South Vietnam  
Chile Lebanon Slovenia  
China Madagascar South Africa 
Colombia Malawi Suriname  
Congo Malaysia Syria  
Congo, Democratic Republic Mali Thailand  
Costa Rica Malta Togo  
Croatia Mexico Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominican Republic Mongolia Tunisia  
Ecuador Moldova Turkey  
El Salvador Morocco Uganda  
Egypt Mozambique Burkina Faso 
Ethiopia Oman Uruguay  
Gambia Namibia Venezuela  
Ghanaª Nicaragua Yemen  
Guatemala Nigerª Zambia  
Guinea    
ªremoved from the final sample due to extreme outlier figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Summary Statistics   
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    Obs Mean St. dev Min Max 
Corruption Variables      
ICRG  2081 4.64 1.82 0 10
World Bank 1089 -0.35 0.71 -2.12 2.43
CPI  912 3.52 1.48 0.4 9.4
Development aid      
Total ODA 2360 0.46 1.68 -17.26 26.47
Multilateral 2358 0.29 1.13 -17.44 18.83
Bilateral  2355 0.16 0.68 -0.06 9.99
Control Variables      
logGDP (per capita) 2745 8.07 0.98 5.85 10.34
Democracy (inverted) 2985 2.94 2.12 1 7
Ethnic Fractionalization 3100 0.414 0.283 0.002 0.92
UK Common  3696 0.31 0.46 0 1
Instrumented Variables      
E. Europe  3696 0.17 0.38 0 1
Latin Am.  3696 0.11 0.31 0 1
E. Asia   3696 0.03 0.16 0 1
SE. Asia  3696 0.07 0.26 0 1
S. Asia   3696 0.05 0.22 0 1
Pac. Islands  3696 0.07 0.25 0 1
Caribbean  3696 0.08 0.27 0 1
Mid. East/ N. Africa 3696 0.12 0.32   
Ex. French Colony 3696 0.16 0.36 0 1
Ex. Spanish Colony 3696 0.11 0.31 0 1
Ex. Portuguese Colony 3696 0.03 0.18 0 1
note: sample consists of ODA recipient countries only from 1986-2006 
 
